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California Wrongful Discharge Law
Turns Toward The Plaintiff
I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, an employer has been entitled under common law to hire and fire
whomever it pleases as part of the employer's right to run its enterprise.' While the
rest of the industrialized world has left the doctrine behind,2 most of the United
States still supports the idea that an employee and an employer may choose to
terminate the employment relationship at any time for any reason.' California
codified this doctrine in its labor code: "An employment, having no specified term,
may be terminated at the will of either party on notice to the other."4
Despite strong national support in favor of employment-at-will, what is true
1. See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN & LANCE LIEBMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT LAW
3D 882, 882, (1994) (summarizing the rights of management historically to "hire and fire whomever
it pleased"); see also Payne v. Western & At. Ry., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884) (setting forth the first
judicial statement about the at-will employment doctrine: "All may dismiss their employees at will, be
they many or few, for good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally wrong, without being thereby
guilty of legal wrong."); SAMUEL WILLISTON & WALTER H. E. JAEGER, Williston on Contracts § 1017
(3d ed. 1967 & Supp. 1998); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 442 (1958). See generally, Jay
M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment At Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118 (1976)
(discussing thoroughly the history of the at-will employment doctrine).
2. See St. Antoine, Employee Terminations and the Erosion ofthe At-Will Employment Doctrine,
DEVELOPING RIGHTS OF EMPLOYEES IN THE WORKPLACE 36, 42 (C. Bakaly & J. Feerick eds. 1981)
(noting that sixty-five other nations employ a just cause standard of dismissal for its workers); see also
Mark A. Fahleson, The Public Policy Exception To Employment At Will - When Should Courts Defer
to the Legislature?, 72 NEB. L. REV. 956, 959 n.9 (1993) (noting that other Westernized countries have
abandoned the at-will employment doctrine); Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating
Just Cause And Employment At Will, 92 MICH. L. REV. 8, 9-10 (1993) (acknowledging the view of
many commentators that the United States is behind the rest of the world when it comes to at-will
employment); Samuel Estreicher, Unjust Dismissal Laws: Some Cautionary Notes, 33 AM. J. COMP.
L. 310, 311 (1985) ("We seem to stand virtually alone among the nations of the Western industrialized
world in not providing general protection against unjust discharge for private-sector employees ... ").
3. See Anthony Miller & R. Wayne Estes, Recent Judicial Limitations on the Right to Discharge:
A California Trilogy, 16 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 65-66 (1982) (noting that the United States stands out
from other industrialized Western European countries by not guaranteeing private sector workers a right
of fair dismissal); see also Kathleen C. McGowan, Note, Unequal Opportunity in At-Will Employment:
The Search ForA Remedy, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 141, 144 (1998) (stating that the at-will employment
doctrine is currently "so deeply entrenched within this country's judicial decisions that any deviation
from the doctrine is viewed by the courts as a heresy that should not be instituted."). But see MONT.
CODE ANN. § 39-2-904 (1995) and P.R. LAWS ANN. title 29, § 185a (Supp. 1996) (both statues codify
the just cause requirement for all employment).
4. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (West 1989). See generally Lewis L. Maltby, The Decline of
Employment At Will-A Quantitative Analysis, 41 LAB. L.J. 51 (1990) (concluding, based upon an
analysis of California case law, that the decline of the at-will employment doctrine is overstated).
in practice is much different from the theory.5  Employment-at-will is often
regarded by courts and legislatures as too harsh on employees because of the power
the doctrine gives employers.6 In a market where it is more difficult for an
employee to gain subsequent employment than it is for an employer to find another
employee,7 specific state statutes have arisen to limit an employer's ability to fire
an employee.' Statutory exceptions are now recognized along with three judicial
exceptions to the employment at-will doctrine. The judicial exceptions apply when
there is: 1) an implied-in-fact promise not to fire the employee except for good
cause; 2) an implied covenant of good faith; and 3) when the discharge is in
violation of public policy, the exception most frequently used.9
5. See Nora J. Pasman, The Public Interest Exception to the Employment-At-Will Doctrine: From
Crime Victims to Whistleblowers, Will the Real Public Policy Please Stand Up?, 70 U. DEr. MERCY
L. REV. 559, 560 n.4 (1993) (noting that the at-will employment doctrine, with the basic public policy
exception, "is recognized in 40-45 states."); see also Kenneth J. Kelly, Workplace Litigation, 476 PRAC.
L. INsT./LmG. 7, 49 (1993) (pointing out that twenty-six states have express public policy based
exceptions and eleven more states have limited public policy exceptions to the at-will employment
doctrine).
6. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 1, at 882 (stating that from its inception, the at-will employment
rule has been criticized for its harshness towards employees); see also Note, Protecting Employees At
Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931, 1931 (1983)
[hereinafter Protecting Employees] (discussing the attacks by courts and scholars on the at-will
employment doctrine); John D. McKinnon, Ruling Aids Worker Who Blew Whistle, WALL ST. J., July
22, 1998, at F1 (stating that forty-two state courts have created judicial exceptions to the at-will
employment doctrine for whistleblowing employees). Federal statutes also proscribe an employer's
ability to fire for any reason. See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §
621 et seq. (Supp. 1998); Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2611 et seq. (Supp.
1998); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1994); Americans With Disabilities Act
of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (1995).
7. See Miller, supra note 3, at 85 (stating that the "modern economic reality may make the
employee's freedom to terminate his employment at-will a fiction.") (citations omitted); see also
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 1, at 882-83 (noting that approximately sixty million private sector employees
are subject to an employment at-will rule, and of the 1.4 million employees that are fired each year,
15,000 are unjust); Laurie A. Erdman, Note, Gantt v. Sentry Insurance: When Can an Employee be
Discharged? Ask the Legislature, 25 PAC. L.J. 107, 107 n.3 (1993) (noting that an employer's legal
ability to use the at-will employment doctrine as a weapon of threatened discharge produces great power
over employees); Jack Stieber & Michael Murray, Protection Against Unjust Discharge: The Needfor
a Federal Statute, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 319, 320 (1983) (advocating a statutory solution to "fully
protect American workers from the harsh consequences of the employment-at-will rule"); Bill Boyce,
Employer's Right to Fire At Will Now Being Eroded, San Diego Union-Tribune, Aug. 14, 1985, at E2
(stating that beginning in the 1960's with the Warren Court and the emphasis on individual rights,
employers were limited in terminating employees by restrictions on race, color, religion, sex or age; this
seriously weakened the at-will employment doctrine).
8. See, e.g., CAL. LABOR CODE § 132(a) (West 1989 & Supp. 1999 ); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-51m
(1997); MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 149, § 185 (1996); MICH. COMP. LAws § 15.361 (1994); N.Y. LAB. LAw
§ 740 (McKinney 1988); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 60-4-5 (1993).
9. See Miller, supra note 3, at 67; see also ROTHSTEIN, supra note 1, at 885-926 (recognizing the
three exceptions to at-will employment and furnishing various cases in support of each exception);
Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Liability For Retaliation Against At-Will Employee For Public
Complaints Or Efforts Relating To Health Or Safety, 75 A.L.R. 4th 13, 24-27 (1990) (stating views of
different jurisdictions recognizing the public policy exception to at-will employment); Christopher L.
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This Note explores the current state of the public policy exception to the at-
will employment doctrine in California. Part I gives a brief history of the evolution
of the employment-at-will doctrine.'" Part II recounts the development of the
public policy exception through California cases." Part III introduces the most
recent California Supreme Court decision on the issue, Green v. Ralee Engineering
Co., 2 and outlines the majority's reasoning in overturning the Court's own
precedent. 3 This section also dissects the majority reasoning and points out
inconsistencies within the opinion itself.'" Part IV examines the Green dissents of
Justices Baxter and Brown and specifically inquires into the impact of Green on
California Labor Code section 1102.5, the Whistleblower Statute. 5 Part V further
explores the reasoning behind the Green dissents and looks at the potential impact
Green will have on wrongful discharge litigation in California. 6
I. PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION TO THE AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE
IN CALIFORNIA
California led the way in dismantling the at-will employment doctrine by way
of public policy in its seminal 1959 decision, Petermann v. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 396. ' Petermann involved an employee
discharged for refusing to perjure himself, and represents the classic wrongful
discharge case utilizing the public policy exception as its basis: allowing an
employee to sue her employer because she was fired for refusing to break the law.' 8
Petermann limited the at-will contract by expressly holding that an employer who
terminates an employee in violation of public policy, even though there is no
statutory bar against such a termination, will not be protected by the at-will
Pennington, The Public Policy Exception to the Employment-At- Will Doctrine: Its Inconsistencies In
Application, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1583, 1594 n.64 (1994) (listing individually each state's public policy
exception to the at-will employment doctrine). But see Sandra J. Mullings, Is There Whistleblower
Protection for Private Employees in New York?, 69 N.Y. ST. B.J. 36,36 (Feb. 1997) (noting that New
York follows a strict application of the at-will employment doctrine and steadfastly refuses to recognize
wrongful discharge claims absent an express statutory directive).
10. See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 17-45 and accompanying text.
12. 960 P.2d 1046 (Cal. 1998).
13. See infra notes 46-70 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 46-70 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 71-83 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 84-123 and accompanying text.
17. 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959). For a general overview and thorough discussion of the public
policy exception to at-will employment in California prior to Green v. Ralee Eng'g, see Erdman, supra
note 7, at 107-56.
18. See Petermann, 344 P.2d at 28.
employment doctrine in a suit by that former employee. 9
After Petermann came Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,2" which reiterated
Petermann's principles and laid the foundation for wrongful discharge law in
California.2" Like its predecessor, Tameny suggested that where the motive for
discharging an employee contravenes substantial public policy principles, the
discharge is wrongful.22 Tameny also added the weapon of tort damages to plaintiff
employees,23 a huge development considering California allows punitive damages
to all claims not sounding in contract.24 The Tameny court opined that public
policy interests favoring an exception to the at-will employment doctrine outweigh
all other considerations the employer has for termination, including factors
supporting the at-will doctrine itself.25
Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.26 served as the precursor to Gantt v. Sentry
Insurance Co.,27 setting California's standard for the public policy exception until
1998.2" Foley established that public policies overcoming the at-will doctrine must
be fundamental and must affect society at large rather than a purely personal or
proprietary interest of the employer or employee.2 9 However, Foley left unan-
swered the question of whether a violation of a statute or constitutional provision
is a sufficiently substantial public policy to support a claim of wrongful
discharge.3"
Gantt subsequently answered that question, taking California wrongful
discharge law towards a more restrictive stance, turning away from the liberal
exceptions favoring employees that California employment law previously
favored.3' Gantt involved an employee fired for supporting a fellow employee in
19. See id.; see also Miller, supra note 3, at 70.
20. 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980).
21. See Miller, supra note 3, at 67.
22. See Tameny, 610 P.2d at 1336; see also Miller, supra note 3, at 71.
23. See Tameny, 610 P.2d at 1335.
24. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West Supp. 1993) (stating that punitive damages are recoverable
in non-contract actions); see also Lawrence C. Levine, Judicial Backpedaling: Putting the Brakes on
California's Law of Wrongful Termination, 20 PAC. L.J. 993, 1050 (1989) (discussing that wrongful
discharge cases brought under California's public policy exception to at-will employment are the only
cases in which the employee may recover tort damages).
25. See Miller, supra note 3, at 72.
26. 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988).
27. 824 P.2d 680 (Cal. 1992), overruled by Green v. Raleigh Eng'g, 960 P.2d 1046 (Cal. 1998).
28. Gantt, which required public policy exceptions to be tethered to a statute or constitutional
provision, not including administrative regulations, was overruled by Green, 960 P.2d at 1049.
29. See Foley, 765 P.2d at 378-79.
30. See Gantt, 824 P.2d at 684 (noting that the court in Foley "declined... to determine whether
the violation of a statute or constitutional provision is invariably a prerequisite to the conclusion that
a discharge violates public policy.").
31. See generally McGowan, supra note 3, at 149-50 (recognizing California's application of the
at-will employment doctrine as "liberalized" compared to strict enforcement states, such as New York,
which rarely depart from the at-will doctrine without express legislative authorization). See also
.Erdman, supra note 7, at 107 (depicting an in depth discussion of the Gantt decision as well as the
public policy exception in California leading up to the Gantt decision).
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her sexual harassment claim against a supervisor.32 Gantt had gone so far as to
contact the Department of Fair Employment and Housing ("DFEH") which assured
him that his job was protected from retaliatory discharge.33 The Gantt court found
difficulty in determining when public policy is sufficiently clear enough to provide
the basis for such a potent remedy as wrongful discharge.34
The court in Gantt recognized that public policy, as a concept, is notoriously
resistant to precise definition.35 The court warned its judicial successors to venture
into this area, if at all, with great care and due deference to the judgment of the
legislative branch lest they mistake their own predilections for public policy which
deserves recognition at law.36
The court solved the problem of defining public policy by requiring public
policy to be tethered to a statute or constitutional provision, and expressly rejected
what other jurisdictions had allowed: permitting such things as administrative
regulations to serve as the basis for a public policy wrongful discharge claim.37
The court reasoned that the potential danger of "judicial policy making could be
avoided if courts in wrongful discharge actions... [are not permitted to] declare
public policy without a basis in either the constitution or statutory provisions." 3
Justice Arabian's majority opinion in Gantt declared that such a restriction
strikes the proper balance because it gives employers notice when to reasonably
expect a wrongful discharge case to go forward in spite of the at-will doctrine. 9
The majority explained that employers should, at a minimum, know of the
fundamental public policies found in constitutional and statutory law.' At the
same time, employees are still protected against employer actions contravening
state public policies because an employee acting pursuant to a statutory obligation
or constitutional provision is permitted to bring a wrongful discharge claim.4 The
majority in Gantt reasoned that its holding would serve society's interest in a more
32. See Gantt, 824 P.2d at 682-83.
33. See id.
34. See id. at 684.
35. See id.; see also Petermann v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25, 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959)
(citing various authorities supporting the evasive nature of defining public policy); Pennington, supra
note 9, at 1627 n.62 (listing several cases describing the difficulty in defining public policy); Protecting
Employees, supra note 6, at 1947 ("Developing a coherent doctrine of 'public policy' has long been
recognized as a source of judicial difficulty and confusion.").
36. See Gantt, 824 P.2d at 687 (quoting Hentzel v. Singer Co., Cal. App. 3d 290,297 (Cal. Ct. App.
1982)).
37. See id. at 687-88.
38. See id. at 687.
39. See id. at 688.
40. See id.
41. See id.
285
stable job market, while still perfecting and preserving important policies. 2
Incidentally, the Gantt court affirmed judgment for the plaintiff because the
employer's retaliation action against an employee aiding a DFEH investigation was
specifically prohibited by statute.
43
California courts have since followed Gantt, and wrongful discharge law has
not seemed to suffer in California due to Gantt's restriction." However, in
September of 1998, the California Supreme Court reversed its holding in Gantt and
expanded the scope of the public policy exception to wrongful discharge in Green
v. Ralee Engineering.5
111. GREEN V. RALEE ENGINEERING
Ralee Engineering manufactured fuselage and wing components used in both
military and civilian aircraft for companies such as Boeing and Northrop.' Green
was an at-will quality control inspector employee of Ralee.47 At the time of his
discharge, Green was working the night shift inspecting various aircraft parts
before the parts were shipped to the plane manufacturers. Starting in the early
1990s, Green allegedly noticed that Ralee was shipping parts that had failed the
inspections he and his team performed.49 During the course of two years, Green
reported the alleged violations to his supervisor, to management personnel, and
even to Ralee's president.5 ° During his employment, Green made only internal
complaints and never went outside the company to the FAA or to any other
government agency or even to the plane manufacturers themselves. 1 Green
contended that his complaints were met with various results and that he began
photocopying inspection reports in order to preserve the substance of his
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See generally Stevenson v. Superior Ct., 941 P.2d 1157, 1161 (Cal. 1997) ("[T]ethering public
policy to specific constitutional or statutory provisions serves not only to avoid judicial interference
with the legislative domain, but also to ensure that employers have adequate notice of the conduct that
will subject them to tort liability to the employees they discharge .... ); Sequoia Ins. Co. v. Superior
Ct., 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 888, 893 (1993) (holding that the statute in question need not prohibit the
employer's precise act, however the claim cannot be loosely based on or simply "derived from" the
statute). In Sequoia, an insurance manager who claimed he was terminated for refusing to artificially
increase reserves to create an illusion of loss and reduce customer refunds was not allowed to bring a
charge of wrongful discharge because there was no violation of public policy as stated in a
constitutional or statutory provision. See also Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 876 P.2d 1022, 1034
(Cal. 1994) (holding that an employee must show an adequate nexus between termination of
employment and public policy violated by employer).
45. 960 P.2d 1046 (Cal. 1998).
46. See id. at 1049.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id.
286
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complaints.52 In March 1991, Green was discharged after Ralee Engineering shut
down its night shift. 3 However, other night inspectors, including some with less
experience than Green, were retained by the company. 4 The wrongful termination
action that Green filed against Ralee was dismissed by the trial court, which had
used Gantt as its rationale.55
Green cited the entire Federal Aviation Act of 195856 to support his claim.
However, the trial court determined that the Act was not specific enough to fulfill
the Gantt public policy exception requirement and granted summary judgment in
favor of Ralee Engineering.57 The California Court of Appeal overturned the
summary judgment and reinstated Green's claim after it independently identified
several key federal regulations on aviation safety, which Green then relied upon in
his case before the California Supreme Court. 8 The appellate court held that the
connection between the public policy of safety in airplane manufacture and federal
aviation law was sufficient to satisfy the rule in Gantt.59
The California Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeal, and in so
doing, included administrative regulation to the public policy exception. Green
expands the public policy exception to the at-will doctrine to now include wrongful
discharge claims based upon public policy interests protected by administrative
regulations as well as by statutes or constitutional provision.' Instead of expressly
reversing its own decision from six years earlier, the Green court reasoned that
administrative regulations implementing fundamental public policies are "tethered"
to the enabling statutes which authorize them, and thus may properly serve as the
basis for a wrongful discharge action.6' This holds true even if the administrative
regulations do not govern the particular employer.62 Although the court stated that
52. See id. at 1049-50.
53. See id. at 1050.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. 49 U.S.C. § 40101 et seq. (1997).
57. See Green, 960 P.2d at 1050.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 1050, 1054 n.6 ("To the extent that one can read Gantt to conclude that important
administrative regulations implementing fundamental public policies... are not 'tethered to' legislative
enactments, we overrule it.").
61. See id. at 1050; see also Phillip Carrizosa, Employees Win Greater Right to Pursue Redress,
L.A. DAILY J., Sep. 1, 1998, at 1.
62. See Green, 960 P.2d at 1058-59 (countering Ralee Engineering's argument that the FAA
regulations did not apply to its business by reasoning that because Ralee's misrepresentation would
contribute to the certification of planes built by manufacturers that were covered by the FAA. The court
further reasoned that by placing the burden on prime manufacturers, the FAA did not intend
subcontractors to ignore those same regulations); see also Badih v. Myers, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 229, 231,
287
the State Legislature is the only governing body "vested with the responsibility to
declare the public policy of the state,"63 the court ultimately held that it is up to the
trial courts to determine which administrative regulations sufficiently stem from a
statute or constitutional provision to support a wrongful discharge claim on public
policy grounds.' 4 The majority explained this apparent contradiction by reasoning
that courts, using administrative regulations, do not supersede legislative authority
because the regulations are formulated by the legislature and implemented by the
executive branch.65
The majority in Green interpreted the Legislature's inclusion of administrative
regulations in California Labor Code section 1102.5, the Whistleblower Statute, as
evidence of the Legislature's belief that fundamental public policy could be
furthered by encouraging employees to challenge employers who ignore these
regulations.66 The court found that delegating the authority to adopt administrative
regulations to an administrative agency in order to fulfill the statute's objective,
instead of having the Legislature write the regulation, might still manifest an
important and fundamental public policy.67
However, while the majority addressed thefact that California's Whistleblow-
er Statue limits its protection to employees who go outside the confines of their
employment to report the suspect activity, the court never addressed why it
superseded that provision of the statute.68
Allowing the whistleblowing employee to proceed with a wrongful discharge
claim without informing a public official of the alleged wrongdoing prevents an
employer from completing an important step in the allegation process. Without the
benefit of an investigation to determine the veracity of the whistleblower's claim,
an employer could be suddenly thrust into court to defend itself first against an
unsubstantiated or proven claim of misconduct by the employer or one of its
employees, and second against the termination of an employee for whatever reason
233 (1995) (holding that a provision of the California Constitution provided a basis for the public
policy exception in a wrongful termination case even though the employer was not covered by the Fair
Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA")); Stevenson v. Superior Ct., 941 P.2d 1157,1175 (Cal. 1997)
(holding that a public policy wrongful termination claim could not be based on age discrimination as
prohibited by the FEHA because the legislature provided for cumulative remedies). But see Thompson
v. Mem'l Hosp. at Easton, 925 F. Supp. 400,407-08 (D. Md. 1996) (holding that because the hospital,
not the employee, had the legal duty to report mis-administration of radiation therapy, no public policy
protected an employee from discharge when the employee informed hospital officials of the problems).
63. See Green, 960 P.2d at 1049.
64. See id. at 1061.
65. See id. at 1054.
66. See id. at 1052; see also CAL. LABOR CODE § 1102.5(b) (West 1989) ("No employer shall
retaliate against an employee for disclosing information to a government or law enforcement agency,
where the employee has reasonable cause to believe that the information discloses a violation of state
or federal statute, or. . . regulation.").
67. See Green, 960 P.2d at 1054.
68. See id. at 1064 (Baxter, J., dissenting).
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or no reason at all. 9 Although the termination may have been justified by the at-
will employment doctrine, such a termination will be difficult for an employer to
defend before a potential jury of employees, many of whom are likely to believe
that an employer needs good cause to discharge despite what applicable law
dictates.70
IV. THE GREEN DISSENTS
A. Justice Baxter
The Green opinion was not unanimous; two justices dissented.7 Justice
Baxter had numerous concerns for California employers and employment law in
the wake of the decision. At the forefront of his concerns was that Green set
forth a standardless rule as to which public policies are sufficient to overcome the
statutory and common law rule of at-will employment." Justice Baxter also argued
that allowing administrative regulations to serve as the basis for a public policy
exception is unfair to employers because no tie is required between the employer
and the administrative regulation.74 Further, the employer would not be assured of
notice as to which regulations will suffice.7" As a consequence of Green,
California employers are now responsible for knowing the rules which apply to
69. See id. at 1064 n.5 (Baxter, J., dissenting) (noting that the FAA never conducted an
investigation into the misconduct that Green alleged was occurring); see also Sarno, supra note 9 at 20
(noting that the at-will employment doctrine allows an employer to discharge an employee for "good
cause, for no cause, or even a cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal wrong")
(quoting Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem'l Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1031 (Ariz. 1985)).
70. See Del Jones, Fired Workers, Fight Back ... and Win. Laws, Juries Shift Protection to
Terminated Employees, USA TODAY, Apr. 2, 1998, at B I (stating how juries are often "swayed by
appeals to fairness" despite the at-will employment laws that are in place).
71. See Green, 960 P.2d at 1062, 1066.
72. See id. at 1062-66 (Baxter, J., dissenting).
73. See id. at 1066 (Baxter, J., dissenting).
74. See id. at 1063 (Baxter, J., dissenting).
75. See id.; see also Bill Boyce, Employer's Right to Fire At Will Now Being Eroded, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIBUNE, Aug. 14, 1985, at E2 (stating that the threat of one large damage settlement resulting
from a wrongful discharge case turns an employer's everyday operation into a "legal crapshoot" and
puts employer decisions, such as what is good cause for firing its own employees, into the hands of a
jury instead); Anastasio v. Knights of Columbus, et al., 1998 WL 305498 (Conn. Super. Ct.) at *6
(holding that a plaintiffs failure to plead the particular statute or constitutional basis upon which he
relies to support his public policy exception in a wrongful discharge action gives insufficient notice to
a defendant).
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their business as well as any business with which they contract.7 6 Employers are
not subject to discipline by the administrative agency promulgating the rule because
the employer is not governed by the agency, yet, the employer may still face
judicial liability for wrongful discharge based on public policy a court may find
pursuant to such a regulation."
In addition, because individual trial judges decide which administrative
regulations are sufficient, judges will be allowed to enforce their own predilections
for public policy whenever there is some regulatory expression on the subject.7"
Justice Baxter argued that the majority was intruding on the Legislature's domain
by expanding the Whistleblower Statute because the Legislature had specifically
restricted the statute to situations where an employee reports violations to outside
agencies.79
B. Justice Brown
Justice Brown joined in Justice Baxter's dissent, but explored the conse-
quences of the majority opinion even further in some areas.8" Justice Brown's
primary concern was that the decision gives ultimate control over articulation and
implementation of public policy to the courts, which historically, have done an
inconsistent job of defining the parameters of the exception.8 ' Justice Brown was
sharply critical of the original public policy decision in Tameny and of the court
decisions following it which "simply repeated the 'fundamental public policy'
mantra, which remains, . . . devoid of meaning or content." 2 Justice Brown
surmised that the proper role for courts with respect to the public policy exception
is to provide the remedy in situations where there is a "legislative 'gap' . . . in
vindication of the public policy the statute implicitly reflects."83
76. See Green, 960 P.2d at 1063 (Baxter, J., dissenting) (noting that employers are now "expected
to keep themselves fully informed of regulatory schemes applying to others ...."); see also Judy
Greenwald, Lawyers Differ On Effect Of WhistleblowerRuling, Bus. INS., Sep. 14, 1998, at 2-3 (noting
lawyers' predictions that employee whistleblowing cases will greatly increase after Green). But see
Thompson v. Mem'l Hosp. at Easton, M.D., Inc., 925 F.Supp. 400,407-08 (D. Md. 1996) (holding that
because the duty to report mis-administration of radiation therapy belonged to the licensed hospital and
not the plaintiff, no public policy was violated).
77. See Green, 960 P.2d at 1063-64 (Baxter, J., dissenting).
78. See id. at 1065 (Baxter, J., dissenting) (noting that in Green, the plaintiff could not cite any
specific statute or regulation to support his claim and that it was the California Court of Appeal that
"engage[d] in independent research... [and] identified several key federal regulations involving airline
safety on which [the] plaintiff... relie[d].").
79. See id. at 1064 (Baxter, J., dissenting); see also CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.5 (West 1989)
(restricting the protection of whistleblowers to employees who reveal the suspected wrongdoing to
government or law enforcement agencies).
80. See id. at 1066-73 (Brown, J., dissenting).
81. See id. at 1069-70 (Brown, J., dissenting).
82. See id. at 1071 (Brown, J., dissenting).
83. See id. at 1072 (Brown, J., dissenting).
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V. GREEN'S IMPACT ON PUBLIC POLICY IN CALIFORNIA
Green's impact on wrongful discharge claims in California remains to be
seen." Constitutional provisions and statutes will likely remain the main source of
public policy for an exception to the at-will employment doctrine. 5 But the
potential for increased wrongful termination litigation now looms as a real threat
for many unwary employers. 6
Regulations are rules and orders issued by different administrative agencies
primarily to guide the activity of those who fall under the authority of the agency
and its own employees.87 Regulations are not the product of the legislature, so
theoretically, they do not have the effect of a statute. However, regulations often
play an important role in determining how cases involving a regulatory activity will
be decided.8 California has over one hundred regulating agencies, each making
independent regulations.89 After Green, California employers will need to evaluate
and determine which administrative regulations may be considered important
enough to constitute protected public policy and consequently serve as a basis for
wrongful discharge claims.9 Green lends some initial, but vague, direction to
employers.9 The wording of the opinion states that statutorily authorized
84. As of the time this paper was written, ten California opinions have cited to Green and the
decisions dealing with the public policy exception to the at-will rule have largely emphasized the
statutory or constitutional basis. See, e.g., Nelson v. United Tech., 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 239, 245 (1999);
Cabesula v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., Inc., 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60, 63 (1998).
85. See Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680, 684 (Cal. 1992) (outlining the reasons for restricting the
public policy exception noting that most cases stemmed from statutory or constitutional authority
anyway: "[A]s courts and commentators alike have noted, the cases in which violations of public policy
are found generally fall into four categories: (1) refusing to violate a statute, (2) performing a statutory
obligation, (3) exercising a statutory right or privilege, and (4) reporting an alleged violation of a statute
of public importance .... ") (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted), overruled by Green v. Raleigh
Eng'g, 960 P.2d 1046 (Cal. 1998).
86. See Greenwald, supra note 76, at 2 (reporting on the split reaction of California labor attorneys
into two groups, one side believing "[t]he decision will inevitably lead to a flood of employment
litigation" while the other side was unimpressed by the impact the decision would have on wrongful
discharge litigation).
87. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1286 (6th ed. 1991).
88. See id.
89. See Green v. Ralee Eng'g, 960 P.2d 1046, 1066 (Cal. 1998) (Baxter, J., dissenting) ("One
cannot deny that there are thousands and thousands of administrative regulations that have been
promulgated pursuant to state and federal statutes.").
90. See id. at 1064 (Baxter, J., dissenting).
91. See id. at 1050, 1054 (stating that adequate administrative regulations would "serve the
statutory objective"). Additionally, Justice Baxter stated that the administrative regulation must
"advance some substantial public policy goal" in order to support a wrongful discharge claim. See id.
at 1064 (Baxter, J., dissenting).
regulations that effectuate the California Legislature's purpose will be sufficient,
although the case gives no direction as to what this means.92 Literally following the
wording of the opinion, any regulation ensuring commercial airline safety certainly
seems to be sufficient.93 Moreover, it appears that any regulation implicating
public safety in general would likewise pass the Green standard.
94
What seems most disconcerting for California employers is that Green has
opened the door for a wrongful discharge claim anytime an employee is fired for
complaining about wrongful activity of its employer or otherwise.95 Hence, Green
greatly encroaches on the area of whistleblowing.96 Green's impact on California's
Whistleblower Statute essentially eliminates the Legislature's directive that an
employee must report any alleged misdoing of an employer or of fellow employees
to an outside agency, rather than merely internally.97 Nationally, whistleblower
statutes are responsible for creating the largest source of expansion of wrongful
92. See id. at 1049, 1061 ("[Sltatutorily authorized regulations that effectuate the Legislature's
purpose ... are 'tethered to' statutory provisions .... [C]ourts must distinguish between those [statutes
and regulations] that promote a 'clearly mandated public policy' and those that do not."). But see
Gantt, 824 P.2d at 687 (stating that "a public policy exception carefully tethered to ... statutory
provision[s] strikes the proper balance."). There is a difference between a public policy being tethered
to a statute and public policy stemming from an administrative regulation that is tethered to a statute
because the latter is further removed.
93. See Green, 960 P.2d at 1058 (stating that the public policy implicated in Green was sufficient
because it "potentially jeopardized airline passenger safety .... Promoting airline safety - the subject
of the federal regulations - constitutes a policy of sufficient public importance."). Additionally, even
if FAA regulations do not provide an adequate basis for public policy, situations such as those involving
Green are still protected by the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine because "the
public interest in airline safety is so profound and the statutory expressions of that concern are so clear
..... See id; see also Carrizosa, supra note 61, at 5. But see Hancock v. Express One Int'l, Inc., 800
S.W.2d 634, 636-37 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that an employer is not liable for discharging a pilot
who refused to fly under conditions violating the FAA regulations because no criminal penalties were
attached to the violation); Adolphsen v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 333, 338-39 (Mo. Ct. App.
1995) (holding that FAA regulations may be source of public policy for exception to at-will employment
doctrine, however, not every regulation regarding aviation safety will suffice as an exception).
94. See Green, 960 P.2d passim (throughout the Green majority opinion, the safety aspect of the
regulation is emphasized); see also id. at 1061-62 (Kennard, J., concurring) (stating that an employee
should be able to recover tort damages "whenever the employer's action in discharging the employee
violated a fundamental public policy delineated in existing law, regardless of the source of the law,
including fundamental public policies delineated in administrative regulations and judicial decisions").
But see id. at 1065 (Baxter, J., dissenting) ("[Tlhe congressionally expressed policy to promote air
safety ... is too generalized a mandate to make any enforcement of the policy practicable through
employmenlrelated litigation.").
95. See generally Carrizosa, supra note 61, at 5; see also Green, 960 P.2d at 1064 (Baxter, J.,
dissenting).
96. See Green, 960 P.2d at 1064 (Baxter, J., dissenting) ("In enacting section 1102.5, the
Legislature made a policy judgment that employees deserve protection from employer retaliation when
they go so far as to contact a public agency .... I see no basis for second-guessing that legislative
judgment .... ). 1
97. See id. ("[T]he facts and analysis in this case indicate that employees may negate the at-will
nature of their employment simply by complaining to their superiors about breaches of contracts with
regulated third party entities.").
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termination cases and are primarily responsible for the continued erosion of the at-
will employment doctrine.98 California specifically restricted its whistleblower
statute to violations reported to public agencies or officials.99 The Green majority
acknowledged as much in its opinion. 1"o The issue in Green was not whether
administrative regulations could ever be a source of public policy, for Whistleblow-
ers Statute section 1102.5(b) says that such regulations are sufficient for that
purpose.1"1 However, the court's decision in Green had no statutory basis to use
the whistleblower provision because the statute did not apply to Green. 112 If it did,
Green would have retained this statutory protection, and the case would have been
able to proceed under Gantt principles using section 1102.5 as the statutory basis
for a public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine.'0 3
Using administrative regulations instead of a statute widens the scope of
employment law and restricts an employer's right to fire an employee even though
the regulation cited does not apply to the employer."1° Also, by combining the
claims of alleged misconduct and wrongful termination, ajury might automatically
associate fault to the employer because of the firing. When an employer is found
to have engaged in misconduct, a jury might incorrectly infer that the firing was
connected to the misconduct.
In Green, after Green's termination, Boeing investigated Green's allegations
of defects in shipping, discovering that Ralee Engineering may have indeed been
98. See Mark Cohen, Exceptions to "At Will" Doctrine Slowly Expand But Courts Still Reluctant
to Sway From Rule, MASS. LAW WKLY, Sep. 8, 1997, at sec. Al (reporting that the largest area of
wrongful discharge litigation expansion involves "alleged violations of public policy, particularly those
involving whistleblowing .... ); see also Kevin M. Smith & John M. Oseth, The Whistleblowing Era:
A Management Perspective, EMPLOYEE RELATIONS L.J., Sep. 22, 1993 n.10, available in 1993 WL
2938876 (listing states protecting public and private sector whistleblowing employees by statute).
99. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.5 (West 1989) ("Employer prohibition of disclosure of information
by employee to government or law enforcement agency .... ).
100. See Green, 960 P.2d at 1052 (Section 1102.5 "does not protect plaintiff, who reported his
suspicions directly to his employer. Nonetheless, it does show the Legislature's interest in encouraging
employees to report workplace activity that may violate important public policies .... ").
101. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.5(b) (West 1989) ("No employer shall retaliate against an employee
for disclosing information to a government or law enforcement agency [based upon a]... violation or
noncompliance with a state or federal regulation.").
102. See id; see also Green, 960 P.2d at 1049 (recounting the fact that Green "made all of his
complaints internally, and at no time did he complain to outside government sources .... [which is]
a requirement for § 1102.5 to apply.").
103. - See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.5(b) (West 1989).
104. See Green, 960 P.2d at 1066 (Baxter, J., dissenting) ("[T]he majority claim to see a 'clearly
mandated public policy' in a regulation that has no applicability to defendant .... By turning their
backs on established precedent, the majority has opened the door to virtually limitless litigation in
California ... ").
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shipping defective airplane parts just as Green had alleged." 5 However, no
investigation was ever conducted by the FAA nor was any action taken by Boeing
other than to terminate its contract with Ralee.'" However, in different instances,
if the employer has not in fact engaged in wrongful conduct, the inference of
wrongdoing still remains where the whistleblowing employee has never gone to an
outside agency and instead brings a wrongful termination suit. 10 7 In such a
situation, the veracity of the claim is not yet established, but it will be on trial
regardless. If Green had gone to the proper public agencies, this case could have
been avoided because Green would have been protected by section 1102.5, a statute
recognizing a specific and important public policy exception to the at-will
employment doctrine.' 8
If the Green court had stated that it was going to allow whistleblowers to
receive protection by reporting only to their employers, it would have overstepped
the bounds of its authority and treaded on the Legislature's domain by reinterpret-
ing the plain meaning of the statute.1°9 Instead, the court added administrative
regulations to the public policy exception, widening the exception not only to
whistleblowers that report a violation of administrative regulations, but also to any
conduct by an employer that the employee can support by an administrative
regulation."0
Legislatures have passed statutes protecting whistleblowers because of the
public good served by such employees; that of exposing wrongdoers for the good
of the public."' However, despite its acknowledgement of the California
Legislature's intent, the Green majority superseded the Legislature's language
105. See Carrizosa, supra note 61, at A5 (reporting that Boeing investigated and confirmed Green's
charges and canceled its contract with Ralee Engineering).
106. See Green, 960 P.2d at 1064 n.5 (Baxter, J., dissenting).
107. See Smith and Oseth, supra note 98, at 181 (noting that employees may not always "blow the
whistle" accurately and can "easily misperceive employer motives and conduct").
108. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.5 (West 1989).
109. See Green, 960 P.2d at 1064 (Baxter, J., dissenting); see also Kizer v. Hanna, 767 P.2d 679,
683 (Cal. 1989) (noting in its interpretation of a state statute for medical payments that "if a statute's
language is clear, then the Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said, and the plain meaning
of the language governs.") (citation omitted); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.5 (West 1989) (plainly stating
that the protection to whistleblowing employees applies only to employees reporting violations to
outside agencies).
110. See id. at 1063 n.3 (Baxter, J., dissenting) (noting that "any 'fundamental' regulatory policy
affecting the public interest may now qualify as a basis for the public policy exception.").
111. See Dan Margolies, Legal Briefs: Worker Loses Verdict Appeal, KAN. CrrY Bus. J., Aug. 15,
1997, at 12 (observing that the rationale behind legislatures' enactment of whistleblowing statutes is
to expose the wrongdoers, which would not occur absent reporting suspicious behavior to outside
parties); see also John Hoerr, A Revolution in Employee Rights Is In the Making, Bus. WK., July 8,
1985, at 72 (stating that allowing an increase in wrongful dismissal cases could acutely affect an
employer's hiring, evaluation and termination procedures because of the huge cost potential of
liability); Pennington, supra note 9, at 1604 (setting out that the rationale behind enacting
whistleblower statutes is the public interest served when an employee is deterred from committing an
illegal act which leads to the prevention of the employer or other employees from committing illegal
acts).
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limiting the statute to violations reported to public agencies, instead expanding the
exception to include violations reported internally as well.112 The Green majority
reasoned that the statute shows the Legislature's interest in encouraging employees
to report workplace activity that may violate public policy." 3
Even before Green, wrongful discharge claims constituted significant court
action for California employers." 4 Compounding-the issue is the fact that a
wrongful discharge suit costs an average of $80,000 to defend, without even taking
potential damages into consideration." 5 Moreover, at trial, California employers
often face unsympathetic juries who disagree with the notion of at-will employ-
ment, siding instead with the discharged employee." 6 With the average award of
a wrongful discharge case hovering in the mid six-figure range, any increase in
potential liability surrounding this employment area is a source of concern for
112. See Green, 960 P.2d at 1052. In Green, the court noted as follows:
Section 1102.5 does not protect a plaintiff who reports suspicions directly to his employer.
Nonetheless, it does show the Legislature's interest in encouraging employees to report
workplace activity that may violate important public policies that the Legislature has stated
.... Thus our Legislature believes that... regulations are sufficiently important to justify
encouraging employees to challenge employers who ignore those policies.
Id.
113. See id.; see also Greenwald, supra note 76, at 2. But see Fox v. MCI Communication Corp.,
931 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1997) (holding that termination of an employee who reported criminal
violations to employer rather than public authorities "did not contravene clear and substantial public
policy").
114. See Hoerr, supra note 11, at 76 (estimating that 5,000 to 10,000 wrongful discharge suits are
initiated each year); see also Jacqueline R. DeSouza, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Methods To
Address Workplace Conflict In Health Services Organizations, HosP. & HEALTH SERV. ADMIN., Sep.
1, 1998, at 453 (finding that litigation of workplace disputes has increased over 2,000% over the past
20 years with wrongful discharge comprising the largest source of employment litigation). But see Jury
Verdict Research study found in Committee Report for 1995 California Senate Bill No. 964, 1995-96
Regular Session available in WESTLAW at Comm. Rep. CA S.B. 964 (stating that wrongful
termination cases for manufacturer employers constitute only six percent of suits filed against them and
had the second to lowest average verdict awarded out of five major categories of cases examined).
115. See David Frum, The Right to Fire, FORBES, Oct. 26,1992, at 76 (average based on a California
sample).
116. See Bill Boyce, If the Boss Gives You the Ax, He May End Up Paying for It, CHICAGO TRIBUNE,
July 9, 1985, available in 1985 WL 2529727; see also Hoerr, supra note 111, at 73 ("[C]ases often go
to juries made up largely of employees who are sympathetic to the problem of other employees.");
Hoerr, supra note 111, at 74 (quoting former Labor Secretary, John T. Dunlop: "I think the notion that
an employer can get out of bed and fire anybody for any old reason is repugnant to a society of
employees ...."); Anne Fisher, Ask Annie, FORTUNE, April 13, 1998, at 172 (advising that although
the law predominantly supports the at-will employment doctrine, ajury often disregards the law because
they equate a general perception of unfairness with wrongful discharge).
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employers." 7 With those amounts in mind, California employers, faced with the
prospect of increasing numbers of wrongful discharge cases, will be less likely to
fire employees even if the claim would not have upheld in court."' Over time,
employers will have incentives to reduce the number of workers because of the risk
of hiring a "bad" employee." 9 Green appears to have effectuated an end to at-will
employment in California. 20
A number of other jurisdictions have adopted laws similar to Green's
approach, allowing administrative regulations to support a public policy exception
to the at-will employment doctrine.' 2 '
117. See Kenneth T. Lopatka, The Emerging Law of Wrongful Discharge-A Quadrennial
Assessment of the Labor Law Issue of the 80s, 40 Bus. LAw 1, 3 (1984) (recounting results of two
California jury surveys of superior court decisions showing plaintiffs in wrongful discharge cases
prevail 90-95% of the time with average awards of $450,000 to $548,000); see also Committee Report
for 1995 California Senate Bill No. 964, 1995-96 Regular Session available in WESTLAW at Comm.
Rep. CA S.B. 964 (quoting from a study conducted by the California Labor and Employment Section
of the California State Bar that the average verdict in a wrongful discharge suit was $519,000 in 1989
and $1.5 million in 1991 and that the median verdict in the three years after the Foley case tripled in
size); Cliff Palefsky, Wrongful Termination Litigation: 'Dagwood' and Goliath, 62 MICH. B.J. 776
(1983) (noting that 90% of wrongful discharge cases proceeding to juries ended with plaintiffs' verdicts
and an average award of $450,000); Pasman, supra note 5, at 561 (noting that various studies dealing
with California juries show that employees win approximately 70% of wrongful discharge claims with
average awards ranging between $300 to $500,000). Nationwide, individual employees have received
wrongful discharge verdicts as high as $20 million, $4.7 million, $3.5 million, $2.57 million and $2
million. See id. With punitive damages available, jury awards exceeding $1 million are common. See
id.
118. See Jones, supra note 70, at B 1 (outlining some of the difficulties employers have in firing
employees at all).
119. See Frum, supra note 115, at 80; see also Jones, supra note 70, at B 1 ("[Tihe sudden shift [in
wrongful discharge litigation] is hurting job creation because [employers] are reluctant to hire unproven
workers they can't fire."). The Jones article also cites a 50% increase in the number of California small
business owners who would be willing to hire welfare recipients whose wages would be subsidized by
the government if there was no threat of a wrongful discharge lawsuit. See id; see also Hoerr, supra
note 111, at 72 (stating that increased wrongful discharge allowances could "have an enormous impact
on management methods").
120. See Green, 960 P.2d at 1066 (Baxter, J., dissenting) (stating that the thousands of administrative
regulations, coupled with the lack of a meaningful standard for determining what is sufficient public
policy, "makes it inevitable that the once-limited exception will become the general rule and effectively
nullify the concept of at-will employment"); see also Jones, supra note 70, at B 1 (noting the exceptions
to at-will employment have all but swallowed up the rule).
121. See generally, Linda Forsythe, Comment, Duration of Employment-At-Will, 56 U. MO. KAN.
CITY L. REV. 343,357-58 (1988) (outlining the approach of different jurisdictions to the public policy
exception to at-will employment); Mark D. Wagoner, Jr., The Public Policy Exception to the
Employment At Will Doctrine In Ohio: A Need For A Legislative Approach, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1799,
1808 & n.35 (1996) (providing a non-exhaustive list of cases which outline the various acceptable
public policy requirements in each state that would qualify for the public policy exception to at-will
employment). For examples of different states who follow approaches similar to Green, see, e.g., Pierce
v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 512 (N.J. 1980) (allowing a wrongful discharge action where a
"clear mandate of public policy" is found and where such mandates are garnered from administrative
regulations); Cloutierv. Great Atd. & Pac. Tea Co., Inc., 436 A.2d 1140, 1144 (N.H. 1981) (holding that
any showing by an employee that her employer acted in bad faith or with malice will support a claim
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Other jurisdictions continue to follow a Gantt approach to the public policy
exception. Connecticut, Wisconsin, Kentucky, Texas, and Ohio, among others,
allow for a public policy exception, but restrict the basis for such a claim to statutes
or constitutional provisions. 2 2  Iowa specifically rejects Federal Aviation
Administration regulations as a basis for a public policy exception to at-will
employment.'23
VI. CONCLUSION
The American dream has become tied to the American job, and with that has
come a changing attitude about an employee's right to keep that job. By allowing
administrative regulations to provide a public policy basis for wrongful discharge
claims, the California Supreme Court may have over stretched the bounds provided
by the State Legislature, while recognizing a national employment trend. The days
for an employer to arbitrarily discharge an employee appear to be numbered.
JENNIFER VANSE
of wrongful discharge regardless of whether statute, regulation, or any other provision is implicated
specifically); Anderson v. Evergreen Int'l Airlines, Inc., 886 P.2d 1068, 1072-73 (Or. Ct. App. 1994)
(sating that an aircraft maintenance engineer who claimed he was wrongfully dismissed from his job
for refusing to install defective airline parts and lie to FAA about a plane's air worthiness could use
FAA regulations as his basis for invoking the public policy exception to at-will employment); Painter
v. Galey, 639 N.E.2d 51, 56 (Ohio 1994) (recognizing Ohio precedent that administrative regulations
may support a claim of wrongful discharge based on a public policy exception); Stephenson v. Litton
Sys., Inc., 646 N.E.2d 259, 261 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (holding that the basis ofpublic policy exception
is not limited to statutes and constitutional provisions, but also includes other sources); Green v. Ralee
Eng'g, 960 P.2d 1046, 1052-1053 (Cal. 1998) (discussing the stance various jurisdictions take with
regard to the public policy exception to at-will employment); Rocky Mt. Hosp. & Med. Serv. v.
Mariani, 916 P.2d 519, 524-25 (Co. 1996) (holding that sources of public policy for a wrongful
dismissal claim need not be limited to constitutional or statutory provisions); Boyle v. Vista Eyewear,
Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859, 876-77 (Mo. App. 1985) (stating that public policies enunciated in the
constitution, statutes, and regulations made pursuant to statutes are sufficient in forming a public policy
.exception to at-will employment doctrine).
122. See, e.g., Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385, 387, 389 (Conn. 1980);
Firestone Textile Co. Div. v. Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730, 733 (Ky. 1983); Brockmeyer v. Dun &
Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 840 (Wisc. 1983) (holding that recovery is allowable if an at-will
employee is fired as a result of an employer's bad faith or malicious activity by the employer).
123. See McCarthy v. Cycare Sys., Inc., 1986 WL 4724, *4-5 (N.D. I11. 1986) (holding that FAA
regulations fail to provide an adequate public policy basis for state wrongful discharge claim); see also
Rachford v. Evergreen Int'l Airlines, Inc., 596 F.Supp. 385, 385-86 (ND Ill. 1984) (holding that FAA
regulations did not provide basis for state wrongful discharge claim because state had "no interest in
enforcing federal law" despite the fact that the state had a "general policy in favor of aviation safety").
297

